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Embedding ecosystem services ideas into policy processes: an institutional
analysis
Duncan J. Russel 1 and John Turnpenny 2
ABSTRACT. What helps or limits the use of ecosystem services ideas in practice? In this paper we develop and test a new institutionalist-
based analytical scheme to explore how ecosystem services as a “new” policy idea might interact with established policy regimes,
processes, and norms. The scheme is based on three different decision-making levels: micro, meso, and macro. To test the plausibility
of the scheme, it is applied to the case of the UK where a specific ecosystem services framework (ESF) was prioritized as a new way
of doing environmental policy after 2011. Drawing on findings from 32 elite interviews, the paper shows how dynamics at all three
levels intersect with differing institutional explanations. It helps explain important factors for embedding, or restricting embedding, of
the ESF in policy making. The scheme provides a useful way to link analysis of the “lived experience” of policy actors implementing
the ESF with the institutional landscape they occupy, and allows for a nuanced and integrated analysis of the potential barriers faced
by ecosystem services ideas generally.
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INTRODUCTION
Ideas to better capture the value of the natural environment in
the form of ecosystem services (e.g., Costanza et al. 2014, Rafaelli
2016) have a long history and a rich variety of disciplinary origins
(Turnpenny and Russel 2017). But the path from idea to policy is
not always smooth. Studying the influence or lack thereof of
particular ideas on policy processes, and factors that affect this
influence, forms a large and growing area of literature in political
studies (Schmidt 2008, Parsons 2016). Moreover, recent work in
this journal (Noe et al. 2017, Challenger et al. 2018, Nordin et al.
2017, Waylen et al. 2015) and elsewhere (e.g., Jordan and Russel
2014, Turnpenny and Russel 2017) has shown that embedding
ideas about more ecologically sensitive policy making can be far
from easy. The role institutions such as established policy regimes,
processes, and norms play in facilitating or blocking the influence
of new ideas in policy processes is an old question. As Margaret
Weir (1992) noted, institutions create opportunities for
innovation but bound what types are possible. This is particularly
the case for environmental policy making, replete with ideas about
problems and solutions, cutting across multiple policy areas such
as transport, water, energy, and agriculture (Carter 2018).
Crudely, therefore, new environmental policy ideas such as
ecosystem services often encounter “a lot of institution” when
attempts are made to use them to influence policy change. We
develop an exploratory analytical scheme to understand the
different institutions (Peters 2016) that may confront ecosystem
services ideas when attempts are made to better capture the value
of the environment in policy decision-making processes. To test
the scheme, we apply it to the empirical case of the implementation
of the United Kingdom’s 2011 Natural Environment White Paper
(Defra 2011). Our main aim is not to provide a definitive
explanation of this case. Rather, we illustrate the utility of our
scheme in drawing attention to different institutional processes
that can be in play, and point to further areas of research to
provide more detailed explanations.  
There are several reasons for using the UK case. The White Paper
drew on analysis from a government-sponsored National
Ecosystem Assessment (NEA 2011), with the UK being one of
the first countries (Waylen and Young 2014) to conduct such an
assessment. The White Paper aimed at a major change in how
environmental goals were delivered through policy making. At its
core were a reduced focus on direct regulation, while better
capturing environmental value (both monetary and nonmonetary)
to society through an ecosystem services framework (ESF) based
around a more integrated approach to environmental
management. In this context, the ESF aimed at better
understanding of “the processes that link human societies and
their wellbeing with the environment” (NEA 2011:15). The White
Paper said “[ministries] will be open about the steps they are
taking to address biodiversity and the needs of the natural
environment, including actions to: promote, conserve and
enhance biodiversity; and reduce the environmental impacts of
food and catering services” (Defra 2011:43).  
One might imagine such a policy idea that was well-established
conceptually and had emerged from well-respected scholarship
(MEA 2005, NEA 2011), and was given a clear national policy
steer, would be implemented in a widespread fashion. But the
embedding of the ESF required ministries to adopt new
institutional processes and practices to better capture ecological
value in their activities, through, for example, data collection, ex
ante appraisal of policies and evaluation mechanisms (see for
instance Turnpenny and Russel 2017). And the ESF, while
relatively simple in its basic concept, has been shown to have
multiple different ideas attached to it in both theoretical debates
and policy practice (Turnpenny and Russel 2017). It has also been
repeatedly argued that the UK has fallen short of its ambitious
environmental policy goals, due in part to institutional constraints
(Russel and Jordan 2008). In sum, we suggest the great
expectations around the White Paper were particularly likely to
encounter a wide range of institutional challenges. Given the
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above, rather than choosing a definition of ESF a priori, we focus
on the term as it was actually used, and explore the various
interpretations through “lived experience” of what ESF is in
different institutional contexts as part of the empirical research.
This allows for multiple interpretations and reasons for (not)
embedding or using the ESF as it was differently understood.
IDEA-INSTITUTION RELATIONSHIPS: AN
ANALYTICAL SCHEME
Institutions are critical for embedding new policy ideas and
associated processes and practice (Oliver and Pemberton 2004,
Béland 2005, 2009, Kern 2011, Peters 2016). We follow Scharpf’s
(1997:38) definition of institutions as “systems of rules, norms
and cultural systems of meaning that shape the courses of action.”
Crucially, as Béland (2009) observes, institutions define “rules of
the game” and associated political opportunity structures. As
such, institutions can constrain and create opportunities
depending on how ideas fit with existing institutional rules (Kern
2011), and challenge powerful actors (Béland 2009).  
Various strands of institutionalism have emerged in the past three
decades offering different explanatory perspectives (Peters 2016).
In this paper, we draw on three commonly used strands (Hall and
Taylor 1996, Peters 2016) in which decision-making logics emerge
through institutional processes that shape values that in turn lead
to the creation of norms: the development of set behavior-based
practices and actions and attitudes toward those practices.
However, each strand has a different rationale in terms of what
drives the logics. A rational choice institutionalist explanation is
based on actors behaving, according to their (given) preferences,
to optimize utility within the constraints established by
institutions. Institutions here are purposefully constructed to
ensure a collectively rational outcome that would not materialize
if  everybody acted individually on their preferences, a “logic of
consequence” (Peters 2016). By contrast, a sociological
institutionalist explanation is based on collective decision making
driven by “what one can imagine oneself  doing” (Hall and Taylor
1996:948, Peters 2016) in particular contexts. The institutions here
are values-based routinized norms that dictate decision rules, and
frames of meaning. In this “logic of appropriateness,” actors
behave, through a process of socialization, according to the
surrounding institutions. Agency is lower than in a rational choice
explanation, but not zero because institutions are still actively
created and refined, although not necessarily with the same degree
of preference-satisfying purpose. Third, a historical institutionalist
explanation is based on the “logic of path dependency”: outcomes
are dependent on the structural history of decision making (Peters
2016). Institutions are said to be “sticky” and hard to change
because of embedded power relationships, political authority, and
the weight of past decisions. Actors are therefore argued to be
objects and agents of history meaning that agency is lower still
than in a sociological explanation. More recently, different
approaches have opened up (Lowndes and Roberts 2013). In place
of various institutionalist strands offering competing
explanations, the strands are more often used to illuminate
different elements of common themes, such as rules, practices,
and narratives (Lowndes and Roberts 2013) that cross all strands.
In this approach, “the character of constraint ... is an empirical
rather than an ontological matter” (Lowndes and Roberts
2013:76): “As actors encounter institutions ... they are likely to be
motivated by (some combination of) their selfish interests, their
‘need to belong’, and their underlying ideas and values” (Lowndes
2018:71).  
In this spirit, we build on the work of Turnpenny and Russel
(2017), following an inductive exploratory approach to examine
how institutional dynamics operating at three different decision-
making levels embody different strands of institutionalism, and
are thus crucial to influencing how the ESF is embedded in policy
making. The micro level is concerned with the individual behavior
of policy makers who have to engage with the ESF: their behavior
and the resource constraints (e.g., expertise, professional
background, timescale, awareness, understanding) that bear upon
them. As Berman (1998, as cited in Oliver and Pemberton 2004)
notes, ideas need transmitters, individuals or groups, to promote
the idea, influence behavior, and build coalitions (also see Béland
2005). However, institutions place constraints on the actions
(Torfing 2001) of individual actors in policy making because of
the informal and formal policy making rules often operating at a
higher meso level. The meso level is concerned with organizational
dynamics, including organizational procedures and management
structures, systems of knowledge transfer, norms and incentive
structures, and interorganization competition. Behavior is driven
by formal and informal policy making rules, and goals of policy
making organizations. Among other things, rules make it possible
to coordinate simultaneous activities, avoid conflict, and help to
mitigate against unpredictability (March and Olsen 1989), and to
reduce “the time and energy otherwise used on thousands of
decisions about how to perceive and evaluate an otherwise
unintelligible stream of information” (March and Olsen
1996:253). Although over time or in times of acute crisis, these
rules and routines can change, it is said that they tend to have a
“surprising durability,” which gives the impression of inertia. The
macro level is concerned with the wider political, economic, and
social context, including dominant values, norms, and goals.
Institutional organization of the polity, society, and the economy
structures behavior, and promotes certain values and ideas over
others (Weir and Skocpol 1985, Hall and Taylor 1996).  
The levels clearly interact; there is no assumption that the macro
level provides the overarching societal and political structure
within which decisions at other levels are taken. And each level
may contain evidence of differing institutionalist explanations.
The ways that institutional explanations and different levels
interact with, and shape, each other in the attempts to embed the
ESF in UK policy making is an empirical question addressed in
the rest of this paper. Our claim is the three levels approach
provides a relatively simple way to obtain empirical information
because levels are intuitively familiar to policy actors, the ways
they work, and the structures they work within. Moreover, we
seek to probe the plausibility (Eckstein 1975) of the levels
approach as a way to link analysis of the lived experience of policy
actors trying to embed the ESF in their own words with different
potential institutional explanations embedded therein.
METHODS
In this paper we employ the elite interview method (Richards
1996) and draw on 32 interviews with a range of experts within
the UK in 2013/2014. This was the period immediately following
the Natural Environment White Paper and National Ecosystem
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Assessment: a period that might be expected to have high
recognition and traction of the ESF as an idea, but where existing
institutions seem to have experienced significant challenges
(Turnpenny and Russel 2017). The period was a time of flux, and
idea-institution dynamics might be expected to be most
interesting. In this context, it was important to explore how the
interviewees interpreted the ESF and its required integrating into
decision making. To ensure a range of perspectives was captured,
a classification of policy advisors was used to select interviewees.
Howlett (2011:33), synthesizing literature on policy advisors and
advice systems, proposed two dimensions as being particularly
important in classifying policy advisors: “their location inside or
outside of government, and ... how closely they operate to
decision-makers.” Combining these dimensions results in four
communities of policy advisors. These were adopted in this paper:
Core Actors such as government officials and policy analysts
(labelled as interviewees A1 to A15 in the empirical sections
below); Public Sector Insiders such as commissions, task forces,
research councils, advisory bodies (labelled B1 to B6);
Nongovernmental Insiders such as consultants carrying out
policy appraisals (C1 to C4); and Outsiders, e.g., businesses, trade
associations, third sector organizations, independent academics,
think tanks (D1 to D7). Interviews followed a semistructured
format around several headline questions (see Appendix 1) to
allow for both comparability and flexibility (see Bryman 2016).
These questions were broad enough to test points raised in the
literature, while simultaneously avoiding steering or leading the
interviewees. The conversations were led by each interviewee’s
experiences and knowledge. The interviews were conducted either
face-to-face or via telephone. Interview summary transcripts were
produced shortly after each interview.  
Analysis of the data was guided by the questions asked in the
semistructured interviews, which built upon the research
questions and analytical scheme. Following the interviews, the
data underwent thematic analysis, a technique widely used in the
qualitative social sciences (Nowell et al. 2017) for “identifying,
analyzing, organizing, describing, and reporting themes found
within a data set (Braun & Clarke, 2006)” (Nowell et al. 2017:2).
Thematic analysis is especially useful for ensuring the researcher
follows a consistent and well-structured strategy for sorting
qualitative data (King 2004). Following established approaches
(e.g., see Nowell et al. 2007) both authors (1) read and became
very familiar with our interview transcripts and rechecked against
the original recordings; (2) established an initial set of meta codes
based on step one to guide step three. Broad themes were identified
around barriers and enablers to embedding, including aspects
such as valuation, bureaucratic burden, and resources; (3)
revisited the themes in the data for a more fine-grained analysis
so that subthemes emerged. For example the broad theme of
valuation contained subthemes including individual concerns
about the ethics of valuing nature, social resistance to valuing
nature, and concerns about the accuracy of environment value
data; (4) finalized the themes and checked all data assigned to
themes for consistency; (5) documented the themes in relation to
the research questions and analytical scheme, drawing on the
detailed theoretical foundations (see above) to guide us to where
the different themes fit. All stages were conducted by two
researchers independently to check for consistency. Consistency
and reliability were also aided by the use of our interview selection
strategy where respondents with different relationships to the ESF
and the policy processes could be triangulated (Bryman 2016)
within the identified themes to see where perspectives were similar
or differed depending on different affiliations (see also Nowell et
al. 2017).
RESULTS
Micro level
From our data, two main findings emerged at the micro level.
First, it did not necessarily benefit an individual to understand
or be aware of a new idea. Interviewees[1] talked about the
difficulties they faced in getting colleagues to fully understand the
ESF and relate it to their work. For example one interviewee
remarked, “People internally find [the ESF] difficult to grasp. It
is the current sexy term but people struggle to understand what
it means” [Interviewee A3].  
Five[2] interviewees also spoke of low awareness of the issue in
general amongst colleagues. Both the issues of understanding and
low awareness may have been a product of the technical nature
of the ESF, but, under a rational logic, struggling with the concept
might in some cases have been a deliberate tactic. Choosing not
to understand, to avoid having to address the issues ESF raises
around valuing nature[3] and consequent burden or threat,
demonstrated a strong degree of agency. There is evidence that
hierarchical imposition of an idea could have been resented as
extra work, with a resulting barely minimal compliance, “Sticks
tend to result in tick boxes” [interviewee A2].  
The added value of the ESF was also questioned even by
individuals working in the natural environment sector. Three
interviewees[4] suggested this may be because the ESF represented
a threat to professional expertise, and by implication jobs,
particularly in the environment sector. Another clue to why ESF
may have been seen as a threat comes from a more sociological
institutionalist perspective. How was the new idea congruent with
a norm of expected behavior by policy makers, or by those
employing them? For example, one interviewee expressed
skepticism about the chance of embedding ESF in existing policy
making processes, as ESF was regarded purely as “economics in
some people’s minds” [A13]. In a similar vein, four[5] interviewees
thought that the ESF was mainly an exercise in quantification-
and thus, “... people resist it because they think it is just about
monetizing biodiversity which runs against their core values”
[B2].  
It is not clear from the data whether this interpretation of the ESF
was deliberate or not. This distinction might be important because
it implies different logics at play, namely a more rational one for
a deliberate misinterpretation of the concept, and a more
sociological one where established processes for interpreting new
knowledge shape how that knowledge is understood.  
Points raised by some respondents[6] about a lack of suitable data
for handling the ESF might indicate a similar issue: policy makers
were expected to draw on unfamiliar concepts, made more
difficult by lack of complete supporting information. An
uncomfortable expectation of being able to handle this could have
led to a lack of engagement.  
The second main finding at the micro level was the emerging
resource gap for addressing the new idea of ESF. Several
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respondents[7] spoke of an individual skills gap for dealing with
the type of analysis that the ESF entails. A rational institutionalist
perspective might question the extent to which it benefitted
organizations to rearrange their skills profiles in response to a
new idea, before checking carefully that this would continue to
benefit the organization. A historical institutionalist explanation
is also pertinent: another five interviewees[8] observed that because
the established structure of UK government tended to
compartmentalize skills across all levels of government, experts
had limited opportunity to work together on ESF-related matters.
As one respondent put it,  
At the moment skills are siloed, meaning for example
that an economist working on one place may not be
properly linked-up with an ecologist working on the same
place at the moment. So, we need to integrate section
skills [A4].
Meso level
Several findings emerged at the meso level. First was the role of
timing. The applicability of the ESF to existing decision-making
timescales was questioned by some interviewees[9] in two senses:
administrative timescale differences, and differences between
shorter term electoral-cycle driven concerns (often based around
economics) and longer time frames of environmental protection.
Overcoming historically-established ways of handling timescales
was crucial[10]. One perspective was that change simply takes time
[11]: “There has been 25 years of culture of doing these things the
way they are..., so to turn the ship around might take some time”
[D2].  
Second, departmental resistance, ambivalence, or boundary-
drawing was seen as a key issue for diffusion of the ESF into
nonenvironment departments whose work had an impact on
ecosystems quality[12]. A strong drawing of boundaries was seen
by one interviewee as a rational response to avoiding being
overwhelmed with extra work: “This is interesting stuff, but there
is no evidence of its value to us” [A2]. Another interviewee noted
the diluting of one’s own ministry with another’s agenda:  
Although the [Environment] White Paper is a
government document, it is clearly perceived by other
departments as [the Environment Ministry’s] White
Paper. It’s not got the other government departments
interested. They still see it as the [Environment
Ministry’s] or the environment sector’s agenda so they
are not joining up policy for the holistic view present in
the White Paper. This makes implementing it not very
easy [B4]. 
Skepticism of the utility of helping another department achieve
its policy goals would not be unexpected from a rational
institutionalist perspective. The cross-cutting nature of the ESF
as outlined in the 2011 Natural Environment White Paper meant
that its implementation would use resources from different
ministries, to the detriment of achieving their own core goals,
while the Environment Ministry’s utility would be enhanced by
passing the responsibility for action on to others.  
Third, and similar to the micro level, the ESF was seen as a burden
and distraction for the organization as a whole, and therefore
rationally treated similarly to the way an individual policy maker
might: as a tick-box exercise rather than an opportunity to
approach policy making in a different way[13]. But a sociological
institutional perspective can help interpret 14[14] interviewees’
point that the ESF was not particularly congruent with the
organization’s decision-making norms, expressed by querying the
ESF’s applicability to various decision-making situations and
project areas even in the environmental sector. Such situations
included, for example, simple amendments to policy or in
situations where EU policy had to be transposed.  
You start to run into existing practices and ways of doing
things. If you are actually doing nothing it is easier to
bring in the ESF. But where you already have existing
approaches you get adaptation rather than significant
change [B2]. 
In this sense, interviewees spoke of existing policies that did not
reflect the joined-up more flexible nature of the ESF, such as
national (and European) policies and approaches that promoted
the in-situ regulation of the management of sites of special
scientific interest or nature reserves rather than an integrated more
adaptable way of ecological management. In a similar vein, the
European Union’s Common Agricultural Policy was not geared
toward the ESF, being more concerned with environmental
protection and production through farmer support.  
We also observed incongruence between ESF and organizations’
decision-making norms related to a lack of sustained leadership
from ministers, senior civil servants, executive officers, and central
government departments[15]. Indeed, one interviewee noted open
hostility amongst management in his institution:  
The high command tried to sabotage the ESF as it runs
against the reductionist and managerialist culture of [my
institution]. The ecosystems [framework] is thus seen
as inconvenient. So they make the appearance of
implementing the ESF, but in reality they may or may
not be [B1]. 
Fourth, the match (or not) of the new idea with existing processes
was important. Three particular types of mismatch were evident:
of the concept, of structures and of terminology. Many
interviewees[16] were negative about the concept of the ESF,
mainly on the basis of the rational critique of whether it really
added value to existing policy-making processes. Some
interviewees[17] for instance wondered whether the ESF was
something (i.e., greater environmental protection) that had been
attempted (albeit in different guises such as sustainable
development) many times before, suggesting a form of historical
path-dependency. For one (Interviewee A6) it was seen as an
empty buzzword. Others questioned whether employing an ESF
led to better decisions, or whether it added anything to what they
were doing already. For example, one commented, “The common
question is invariably, what is it that we should be doing different
internally?” [B2]. Although interviewees questioned the utility of
the ESF, it was noted by some respondents that regardless of the
concept’s utility, “[the environment ministry] has spent a great
deal of money in promoting [the ESF] and so they have to have
a practical outcome” [C1], giving evidence of maximizing returns
from sunk costs.  
The mismatch of structures formed another significant challenge:
whether the ESF was compatible or not with historically
entrenched institutional arrangements. In some cases, this was
Ecology and Society 25(1): 9
https://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol25/iss1/art9/
framed as a structural problem in terms of institutional
fragmentation and the existence of silos, “... the planning system
doesn’t address agriculture and forestry. These are not covered by
planning and are the responsibility of a different department”
[C1].  
Fragmented institutional arrangements have a history and thus
traction; the consequence of this, according to interviewees[18],
was that policy was often not joined up, which could impede the
ESF as an idea. Crucially there were a lack of institutional
platforms for discussing the management of ecosystems limiting
the opportunity of learning across institutional silos (Interviewee
C2).  
Finally, a mismatch of terminology between the ESF and the
more practical context of policy making was raised[19]. For
instance, one interviewee remarked:  
... at the moment, the concept is so nebulous there is a
danger that it won’t be meaningful.... If I have 10 experts
in a room, I will currently get 10 different approaches [C2]. 
The issue of language was compounded by a lack of clear
terminology[20], with weakly defined concepts like shared social
values, natural capital, environmental valuation, and various
related terms such as the ecosystems approach, tended to muddy
the waters and create ambiguous targets for policy makers. This
meant that for these interviewees there was a lot of confusion over
what the implementation of the ESF in a specific context entailed.
For example, did they have to establish and appraise
environmental values, did they have to produce a natural capital
stocktake, did they need to have a more joined up approach to
ecosystem management? Some interviewees suggested that
academics should more simply and better define their concepts:  
... we operate in an academic world, so there is a lot of
jargon of language and terms surrounding the [ESF].
As things develop, we need to be less worried about the
specifics of jargon. Even if we are not quite talking in the
same terms, are we pushing in the same direction? [A2]. 
Thus, we saw conflicting understandings between academics and
policy makers, operating within different contexts and
expectations of their profession groups, of the appropriate
conceptualizations of the ESF.
Macro level
Similar to both micro and meso levels was the sense of burden or
threat emerging from a new idea at the macro level. Speaking to
a more rational logic, the role of political steering was observed
by five of our respondents[21], which they argued affected the
embedding of the ESF. Politicians responding to public pressures,
party politics, manifesto commitments and crises pushed for their
preferred policy outcome. In such situations embedding the ESF
into policy was seen by some to have been heavy-handed or indeed
superfluous[22]. In these cases, one interviewee (B1) argued that
such pressures meant that the ESF was seen as a threat for overtly
rationalist political reasons, which led to resistance. This could
manifest itself  through a desire to appear to implement while not
actually doing so, using the requirement for, for example,
proportionality in policy making as an excuse to keep the new
idea away.  
Our findings showed that broader political priorities during the
period studied tended to concentrate on economic issues such as
austerity in public spending, and reducing the regulatory burden
[23], to reduce costs and impacts of policy on business and society.
These high-profile macro-level policy discourses and strategy
undermined efforts to mainstream the ESF in policy making. For
instance, according to one interviewee (A5), new procedures or
regulations may have contradicted broader political priorities. As
another interviewee’s rationalist interpretation of this problem
argued, “[the government is keen to] not let environmental
regulation get in the way of infrastructure development and
housing” [B4]. This trend was argued by three respondents[24] to
have worsened during the environment of austerity, which placed
further pressure on resources.  
Our findings also revealed a more sociological institutional
element to why the ESF may have been seen as an inappropriate
way to frame environmental problems, thus hampering its traction
in policy making. Environmentally sympathetic people may be
put off  by the perceived economic framing and question the
underlying ethics of valuing nature in monetary terms, arguing
that nature has a right to exist or be valued beyond its services to
humans[25]. Moreover, to some respondents the whole notion of
the ESF contrasted with broader values of society, which
generally prioritized factors other than ecosystems such as wealth
creation, health, job security, and car-friendly transport policy[26].
DISCUSSION
In this paper we sought to build upon the literature on the
difficulties faced when embedding ideas to better capture the value
of the natural environment into policy. We have examined the role
of institutional dynamics, in the form of established policy
regimes, processes, and norms. The paper used a case—
embedding the ESF in the UK in the period immediately following
the 2011 Natural Environment White Paper—as a plausibility
probe (Eckstein 1975) for an analytical scheme based on different
institutional levels: individual behavior (micro), organizational
dynamics (meso), and wider social and political context (macro).
Micro-level institutional dynamics
Institutions offer incentives and disincentives for certain types of
individuals’ interventions and behaviors, for example how far
dealing with the issues associated with policy ideas can help
achieve formal goals and positive career progression for policy
officials (Hall and Taylor 1996). In relation to this aspect, we
found low awareness of the ESF concept despite some strong
signaling by the core executive, suggesting that the concept was a
long way from helping policy makers achieve formal goals.
Moreover, institutional prioritization shapes how much human
and time resources are available to policy makers to collect
suitable data related to the policy idea, and to integrate this data
into their policy making (Turnpenny et al. 2008, Russel and
Jordan 2009). From our data it appeared that actions at a micro
level were bounded by individuals’ low understanding of the
concept, and/or deliberate subversion, in some cases intentionally
choosing not to understand the concept of the ESF as a
professional or organizational threat. It appeared that individual
action may be bound by “congealed preferences” relating to
rational logics of consequence where decisions are framed around
achieving rational instrumental goals and efforts to reduce
transaction costs of action (Torfing 2001). Sociologically
constructed “logics of appropriateness,” through which images,
symbols, and rituals combine to form rules of behavior that can
lead to the development of shared meaning (Morgan 1997:132)
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or to “webs of meaning” (Marsh et al. 2001:21), were also revealed
at the micro level. These included some of the expected norms of
policy makers that led them to reject (or embrace) the economic
analysis elements of the ESF, on the basis of their professional
identity (Torfing 2001) and beliefs (Hall and Taylor 1996).
Another factor that can bound action is the supply of information
to decision makers (Hall and Taylor 1996, Torfing 2001). As our
data imply, information asymmetries and data gaps made it
difficult for policy makers to understand the impacts of a policy
idea in their sector and the relevance to the policy at hand
(Turnpenny and Russel 2017). In relation to this point and our
data, a “logic of appropriateness” may also help explain the
observed perceived lack of suitable data: the economic data
available on the value of the environment was in conflict with
resistance to “pricing the environment.” Moreover, individual
policy makers have a bounded cognitive capacity and are only
capable of processing and interpreting a given amount of data
(Simon 1985, Béland 2005). The ability to focus on a few core
issues at once may account for the observed low awareness and
ambivalence within our data. Overall, if  an issue raised by a new
policy idea is not seen as core to an official’s job, it can easily be
ignored.
Meso-level institutional dynamics
Rules for handling and embedding new policy ideas at the meso
level may develop for a number of reasons: from a logic of
consequence structuring interactions to stop free-riding and
pursue organizational goals, from a logic of appropriateness in
which webs of meaning shape the rules through which networks
and collectives of policy-making actors interpret policy ideas
(Hall and Taylor 1996), and/or from a logic of path dependency.
In this latter historical institutionalist perspective, rules are
structured around past policy decisions and practices, creating
path dependency and institutional stickiness. Institutional rules
act as external constraints that define the repertoire not the choice
of action (Torfing 2001) and as such structure the range and
sequence of alternative actions when confronting policy making
(Hall and Taylor 1996).  
All manifest in our data. There was a mismatch between the
structured decision-making timescales and the longer timeframes
associated with the ESF. Moreover, rules can structure what is
considered a legitimate course of action (Torfing 2001), or
legitimate evidence to support action (Juntti et al. 2009). Within
the data, the observation that ESF was the Environment
Ministry’s agenda seemingly provoked a rationalist reaction
undermining the ESF’s legitimacy, viewing it instead as a threat
by other ministries. We observed a questioning of the utility of
the ESF, and whether it really represented something different.
Rules either allow space (rule in) or crowd out (rule out) certain
ideas, depending on how the issue fits with established practice
(Torfing 2001, Russel and Jordan 2009). Rules also shape the
relations and interactions of the subunits of an organization,
which may have a set of complementary but also different and
conflicting rules (Richards and Smith 2002). This pattern was
manifest for example in the observed mismatch between the ESF
and other organizational norms; the ESF was observed to run
against established practice. There was similarly an observed
mismatch between ESF and historical institutional structures,
which made embedding ESF in important departments (even
within the environment ministry) difficult. In such situations
where rules conflict between subunits, departmental pluralism or
departmentalism (Russel and Jordan 2009) can develop where the
cross-cutting initiative or idea enthusiastically taken up in one
part of the organization does not fit with the rules of another,
leading in some cases to conflict and active resistance, over the
questioning of the added value of the approach. The data also
showed that sociologically constructed webs of meaning created
different understandings of both the problem the ESF attempted
to address and the proposed solutions to said problems, between
different institutions of science and between the institutions of
science and policy making (also see Turnpenny and Russel 2017).
Macro-level institutional dynamics
Power asymmetries, allowing some groups disproportionate
access to policy making over others (Hall and Taylor 1996), can
lead to the creation of constraints and opportunities for
embedding new ideas (Béland 2005), as the historical sequence of
decisions structure political debate and related dominant
paradigms and values in society (Béland 2005). In such situations,
problems can arise with the embedding of new ideas into policy
making if  that issue is too far from a dominant policy paradigm.
As Niemelä and Saarinen (2012) note, this maintenance of the
dominant norms is akin to the production of cognitive locks, so
rather than a change in policy making approach, policies and
existing institutions are reproduced over time. Thus there is a risk
of path dependency (Hall and Taylor 1996), whereby new policy
ideas are rejected to reduce the risk of instability at the macro
level. Here we see in our data the perception that the ESF was a
threat from a rational institutionalist perspective. In this
understanding, utility-maximizing politicians responded to
public and interest group pressures for reduced policy burden,
especially in times of economic difficulty as in this case study.
Thus, the ESF was employed in an attempt to appease
environmental interests, but not in a way that was disruptive to
traditional policy concerns around the economy. New ideas can
also contradict entrenched societal norms about what is an
important or appropriate subject to consider. In such
circumstances, even if  change is initiated it is marginal as the new
ideas are built upon pre-existing political, societal, and economic
paradigms that dominate a sector and/or wider society (Torfing
2001, Niemelä and Saarinen 2012). Again, we can see examples
of this in our data, including on the one hand wariness of valuing
nature in the environmental sector, and on the other an explicit
prioritizing of nonenvironmental issues among wider societal
groups in the period studied.
Developing and using the analytical scheme
The levels-based analytical scheme, for the case studied, has
helped link analysis of the lived experience of policy actors
working with the ESF in their own words with different potential
institutional explanations embedded therein, adding layers of
nuance, as well as offering a practical approach to empirical
enquiry. It seems to confirm the claim that “each [of the strands
of NI] seems to be providing a partial account of the forces at
work in a given situation” (Hall and Taylor 1996:955). In so doing,
the scheme does not imply that one institutional logic is at play
more than the other, or at specific levels. Rather, it combines
related but different institutional perspectives to explore the types
of responses that a new environmental policy idea might
encounter.  
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Table 1. What might we hear when a new idea comes up against existing institutions?
 
Institutional
logic
Micro level:
individual behavior
Meso level:
organizational dynamics
Macro level:
wider social and political context
Rational CELL 1: “How far does
Idea X help me as an
individual?”
CELL 2: “How far does Idea
X help our organization / unit
/ team protect core resources /
influence / budget?”
CELL 3: “How far does Idea X help
meet wider political and societal
preferences?”
Historical CELL 4: “How familiar
am I with Idea X?”
CELL 5: “How does Idea X
challenge established decision-
making roles and
competencies?”
CELL 6: “How does Idea X
challenge established societal
structures, ideas, and power
relations?”
Sociological CELL 7: “How far is Idea
X consistent with what is
expected of me?”
CELL 8: “How far is Idea X
consistent with how we make
decisions in our organization /
unit / team?”
CELL 9: “How far is Idea X
consistent with wider social norms?”
How might the scheme be used in other cases? Table 1 summarizes
the kinds of responses that might be encountered when listening
to policy actors’ views about a new environmental policy idea,
across the nine intersections between institutional logics and
levels.  
At the micro level, if  the answer to the question in Cell 1 is “no,”
idea X may be seen as a burden or a threat, and likely to be resisted
by the individual. Idea X is also likely to be resisted if  the
individual policy actor is unfamiliar with it (Cell 4). In Cell 7,
expectations on the individual may come from a variety of
sources, colleagues, management, social norms, but to overcome
barriers to embedding, idea X should fit with policy makers’
expectations of what is appropriate activity. At the meso level, in
Cell 2, the implication is the organization, unit, or team will check
to see if  they can still maximize their utility in the face of idea X.
In Cell 5, the source of the entrenchment can come as a result of
exercise of power (“we’ll tread on other departments’ toes”) or of
simple repetition (“this isn’t our job, it’s Ministry A’s”). The
implications are that idea X could either fit with entrenched
decision-making structures, challenge these in a way that leads to
resistance, or challenge these at critical junctures and enable
embedding of the idea. In Cell 8, idea X is more likely to be
embedded if  it fits with organizational decision-making norms,
such as how evidence is collected, when evidence is collected, what
type of evidence to collect, different approaches and timings in
relation to governmental and nongovernmental stakeholders’
involvement, etc. At the macro level, in Cell 3, ideas that
contradict socio-political preferences would be a threat to utility.
In Cell 6, as in Cell 5, an idea’s degree of fit with entrenched
decision-making structures would influence the embedding of the
idea. In Cell 9, idea X is likely to need to fit with social norms to
become embedded.  
The scheme we propose does not necessarily resolve how both the
dynamics at the institutional levels and the drivers of these
dynamics interact. There is clearly interaction between the levels.
For example, individual responses to the idea are determined/
shaped by meso-level organization dynamics and these are in turn
shaped by wider social preferences and values such as whether or
not to monetize the natural environment. Interactions also occur
in different directions; for instance, a lack of resources / expertise
(micro) can influence how far an organization sees an idea as a
concept worth taking seriously (meso). Individual responses are
also shaped by an individual’s position within one of the four
distinct communities of policy advisors, whether they identify
with more than one community, and how well-established their
position and influence is. More directly, such positioning may also
influence the views gathered and reported in this paper. Points
made above by a wide range of types of interviewee may be seen
as less likely to reflect an individual’s own circumstances.  
Moreover, the explanations embedded within the different strands
of institutionalism will interact in a manner that requires further
exploration. For instance, the extent to which policy processes
stem from the rational management of complexity in the policy
sphere, a logic of appropriateness, or historical legacy is not a
question our scheme can necessarily resolve on its own. The
scheme’s usefulness rather lies in revealing different factors
present in any chosen case as a way to direct subsequent more
explanatory research. Exploring first which cells in Table 1 are
present and to what degree can guide development of more
detailed research questions around, for example, which
institutionalist explanation is most strongly at play in a given case.
In this way, our scheme is more research-question-generating than
question-answering.  
Which interesting cases might be examined in such a way?
Although we showed a limited uptake of the ESF and many
institutional constraints in the period studied, there has since been
significant presence of the ideas behind the ESF in national and
local policy in the UK that shows that despite the difficulties of
embedding the ESF, the idea still has traction. For example,
initiatives have included the creation of Nature Improvement
Areas in 2016, which seek to create joined up and resilient
ecological networks at a landscape scale to provide clear economic
and social benefits (Natural England 2016). The 25 Year
Environment Plan (HM Government 2018), promised a new
cross-government approach to governing the environment based
on the notion that environmental protection and enhancement is
crucial to social and economic well-being. An expert Natural
Capital Committee was established in 2012 and reappointed for
a second term in 2016 whose role is to advise government and
oversee the 25 Year Environmental Plan in relation to sustainable
use of natural capital including the benefits the economy and
society derive from nature (HM Government 2016). These
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developments suggest that institutional contexts are not fixed,
they can change significantly over time, although this change may
be slow (Peters 2016, Turnpenny and Russel 2017). Future
research could explore what institutional changes have happened
over time, why, and the impact these have had on uptake of the
idea of ESF. A particular area of focus could be on any gap
between policy steer and what happens on the ground; as this
paper has shown, the inclusion of the ESF in policy documents
does not necessarily mean it is being carried out in practice. For
example, the above-mentioned 25-year Environment Plan has
been criticized for being full of good intentions but lacking legally
binding targets, underpinning legislation and specific practical
solutions (EAC 2018). Drawing on institutional analysis future
research could posit that such plans might not amount to much
in practice in the short term because they will be heavily
dominated by the institutional process they encounter. These
could include inadequate resources or rewards for pursuing the
idea of ESF, lack of support from senior staff, or contradictory
messages at ministerial or cabinet level, among many others. The
dynamics of if/how these factors change over time could be
revealed using the scheme in Table 1 informing both more
explanatory research question development and more targeted
approaches by policy actors to overcome such barriers. For
example, for Cell 1 a suitable strategy might be to link the ESF
to career progression, spending, or budgets. Likewise, the logics
described in Cell 5 might be countered by dedicated training and
censure for failing to adopt the ESF norms. We, therefore, present
Table 1 as consolidation of our exploratory approach so that more
deductive analysis can be pursued in other critical environmental
policy initiatives from a local to a global scale, and where
appropriate targeted strategies can be developed to improve
implementation on the basis of the analysis. Overall, the resulting
more detailed and integrated accounts would not only provide
new academic insights but could be useful in devising policy
strategies for environmental policy that are more sensitive to
institutional environments in which they are expected to perform.  
__________  
[1] Interviewees: A3, A4, A15, B2, C1, C2, C3, C4, D3, D5, D7
[2] A11, A12, A13, A15, B4
[3] A2, B1
[4] A5, B1, C2
[5] B2, C3, C4, D2
[6] A3, A4, A7, B2, B3, B4, B5, C3, C4, D2, D3
[7] A1, A3, A15, B2, C1, C2, C3, D3
[8] A4, A12, C2, C3, D2
[9] A4, A8, A15, B1, B2, B3, C1, C3, D3, D5, D7
[10] B2
[11] B2, D4
[12] A2, A5, A11, B4, C1, D6
[13] A14, B3
[14] A1, A3, A4, A8, A11, A12, A14, A15, B3, B4, B5, C1, C2, D3
[15] A4, A2, B1, B4, D4
[16] A6, A10, A14, A15, C1, C2, C3, D4, D7
[17] A5, A7, A14, B2, B3, C2, D6
[18] A5, A14, C1, D3
[19] A4, A12, C2, C3, D2
[20] A4, A8, A14, C1, C2, C3, C4, D3, D7
[21] A6, A8, A11, A12, D3
[22] A11, A12
[23] A2, A6, A12, B3, B4, B5, C1, D1, D2, D3, D5, D6
[24] A14, B2, D2
[25] B3, D5
[26] A4, A6, A8, B1, B2, B4, B5, C1, D3
Responses to this article can be read online at: 
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